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*'-j-F tlie un(lei\£;racluate,"" says a modern college president^ "can
J_ onl\- get it through his head that Christian morals and natural
morals are two cjuite different things
. . .
that the\' dift'er in aim
and in purpose a vast contusion may be resolved." liut the \ast
confusion observed in the lives of the present generation so far
from being resolved by a consideration of nature as alien to the
Christian life is partially the result of that attitude, b^or the distinc-
tion Mr. Bell would make between natural morals and Christian
morals is the result of an ambiguous hybrid of epistemolog}' and
ethics, the identification of nature with half-knowledge, which, in the
background of theological and philosophical speculation for some
centuries, threatens to darken the landscape.
Xo one will deny that a real relation exists between ethics and
epistemology. The two are at one concerning the nature of good
and of evil. Each concedes the synonym of the abstract terms,
truth and good, error and evil. But though they meet on this one
ground, ethics is as far removed from epistemology as the concrete
is from the abstract. Ethics deals with the relating of experience;
epistemology, with the reverberation of reality. There is no separa-
tion between life and knowledge, but there is a difference of degree
between the theory of life which is truth, or knowledge, and the
theory of the theory, which is epistemology. r>ecause of this differ-
ence, the meeting-ground of ethics and epistemologv is also the
dividing line between them. It has been this indeterminate relation
which has brought about that opposition between nature and spirit
v^^hich sets the one as the principle of reason over against the other
as the tinreasoned principle, or blind force. And for such concep-
1 The Atlantic Monthly, April, 1928. The Chureh and the Undergraduate,
p. 505, by Bernard Iddings Bell, President of St. Stephens College.
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tion. ethics has borrowed the knowledge-levels discovered by episte-
molog\- which belong to the theory of knowledge as such, and which
ai)i)lied to the self merely make for a confused notion of what the
earth-life is all about.
TT
In individual experience the body is at once a place and a posses-
sion though in its intimac>- of relation to the thinking self it exceeds
that of any other place or possession to an almost unimaginable
extent. However, since the dawn of speculation the body has been
identified more or less with the devilish principle. This identifica-
tion has been strengthened by the ancient human desire to rej)udiate
disease and death but it has its roots in nature's alignment with half-
truth by the epistemologists.
Experience has always shown that first judgments are subject
to change. The necessity' for hard and patient thinking was mani-
fest from the earliest adventurings in philosophy. The pre-Socratics
alread\- had put reflection be\'ond naive experience in value for
attaining truth. Illusory appearance was attributed to the deceit of
the senses before the sophist Protagoras identified thought with
sense-perception as one process. lielieving, like earlier thinkers, that
perception is conditioned b}- organic changes in both percipient and
perceived object at the moment of contact, Protagoras' very defini-
tion of perception, or thought, made it unstable. So the great ad-
vance Protagoras made was lost even in the making; and percej^tion
to this day has hardly recovered from the equivocal position given
it when Plato and Aristotle completed the giant task of proving
against the sophists a universal validity for knowledge which
Socrates, with his inductive doctrine, began.
In human experience knowledge progresses from a low state,
which has been held identical with sense-perception since it is co-
incident with primary presentations, to a high state held as pure
thought. For this reason the phenomenal world was considered by
early thinkers as separated from a higher world of thought, by a
difiference of degree, if not of kind.- Plato taught then that the
incorporeal w^orld forms the object of science; but the mistaken
- Democritus expressed the difiference between perception and thought in
quantitative terms : Obscure insight or perception, and genuine insight or
thought, result respectively from the atomic motions of coarse and fine images
of things.
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notion drawn from his teachins^' was tiial the ])henonK'na of the
natural world of the senses are manifestations of immaterial reali-
ties, the Ideas, which exist side by side with them just as ])artial
insight ( Protagorean ])erception ) exists side by side with true in-
sight. Xe\ertheless the most careful studies of I'lato re\eal jiis
conception of the Idea as purely epistemological : The first great
epistemologist meant by the Idea what modern epistemologists mean
by value: he meant by phenomenon what they mean by fact. In
other words, I'lato taught that knowledge about things and events
is progressixely intelligible; and he used the terms "intellectual'' and
"sensuous" as convenient names for knowledge-divisions, and was
at times confused in his own statments by the nomenclature.
Aristotle, more scientist than philosopher, mapped out a system
of development from the lowest expression of reality in truth which
he called matter, to the highest, or jnn'e form. The relation of
matter as mere possibility to form as com])lete actuality removed
for Aristotle the difficulties of separation which he thought he found
in Plato's doctrine. Ikit while there is present an e])istemological
monism in form and matter taken as two sides of one and the same
reality, still the Aristotelian system stresses a marked dualism of
the resistant passivity of matter, and, opposing it. the purposi\e
activity of form. And as Plato also had done Aristotle applied
these limits to bodily and ps}chical activities, an application antici-
pating St. Paul and St. Augustine. An anthropological dualism
thus grew out of the inevitable application of epistemolog}' to
human-conduct—inevitable because of the very nature of truth
which makes difficult the limiting of the theory of knowledge to its
particular field.
Ill
Philo Judaeus who lived during the first century A. D. fell into
the pitfall laid by epistemology. In his reinterpretation of Judaism
in the light of Greek philosoph}' there is found dominant the note
of contrast between spirit and flesh. Spirit, man's true nature,
Philo believed, must engage in continuous strife with man's false
nature, flesh, wdiich actually imprisons and retards the spirit in its
development. It is interesting to note that Philo remaining in the
fold of Judaism insisted on the spirit-flesh antagonism which his
contemporary, Saul of Tarsus, emphasized after his conversion.
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With Philo the reason was admittedly the result of havins^ ingrafted
Greek thought into the Hebrew faith; and Paul, of philosophical
training, was the first among the Christians to take the cross as a
symbol of spirit's literal triumph over the flesh.
Two centuries later than Philo and St. Paul, Plotinus made a
forthright identification of the corporeal world w'ith partial-truth.
The famous metaphor of the founder of Neo-Platonism. drawn
from its prototype in the Republic, though mystically and jjoetically
suggesti\e, is a penetrative analysis of the learning process. J^'rom
truth's exhaustless source light emanates first as spirit, then as
soul and finall}' at its farthest reach forms a twilight with matter.
Matter is dark space, sheer ignorance, or sheer evil. Plotinus shows
in this extraordinary figure that truth is unchanging and unchange-
able as Parmenides had claimed for it before Plato. He gives the
nature of truth in its least manifestation. In the process of knowl-
edge the more light and fuller needed is obtained not by the absorp-
tion of anything external to the thinker but by the mind's return
to itself. There is the further illumination of truth's nature: The
effect of higher determinism if abstracted from this cause appears
as blincl behavior. Unreasoned pozucr is the express rebellion ac/aiusf
truth. What is usually overlooked in Plotinus" remarkable snapshot
of the thinker at the moment of com])lete knowledge is that the
picture has no content, but is of mere knowledge-theory.
IV
Whatever may be the ultimate meaning of nature, it is not found
in setting it over against spirit as its lower stage. And to identify
nature and si)irit with knowledge-states, diametrically oi)posed be-
cause taken from their continuum in knowledge-process, ends by
making epistemology absurd and experience futile.
